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R. v. Lloyd and the Unpredictable 
Stability of Mandatory  
Minimum Litigation 
Asad G. Kiyani* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The adjudication of the constitutionality of mandatory minimum 
sentences by the Supreme Court of Canada presents a contradictory message. 
On the one hand, cases challenging the constitutionality of mandatory 
minimum sentences appear before the Court on a seemingly annual basis. 
On the other hand, the actual treatment of those cases is anything but 
routine, presenting divergent and at times contradictory messages within the 
narrow range of mandatory minimum sentences jurisprudence, sentencing 
law more generally, and the definition of Charter rights broadly speaking. 
The Court’s decision in R. v. Lloyd1 is the latest iteration in this line of cases, 
clarifying and confusing the state of the law in the best traditions of Charter 
adjudication. 
This article considers three dimensions of this mercurial jurisprudence, 
outlining the current state of the law, its relationship to prior case law, and 
implications for future decisions. The second part of the article addresses the 
general signal sent by the Court to Parliament on its design of mandatory 
minimum sentencing regimes. The Court has been clear that Parliament  
can Charter-proof mandatory minimum sentences by crafting statutory 
provisions in more narrow terms, or granting judges the statutory authority 
to deviate from mandatory minimums in certain cases. However, the first of 
these propositions is challenged by Lloyd, in which a narrowly-drafted 
provision is ruled unconstitutional. The second represents an unexpected 
departure from strong policy-based arguments presented in previous cases.  
                                                                                                                       
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law – University of Victoria. Thanks are due to Arooba 
Shakeel (JD 2018, Western) for her extensive research and helpful suggestions, to Andrew 
Mendelson (JD 2019, Victoria) for his careful editing, and to Benjamin Berger, Sonia Lawrence, and 
Wade Wright for their comments on earlier drafts. 
1 [2016] S.C.J. No. 13, 2016 SCC 13, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 130 (S.C.C.) [hereainafter “Lloyd”]. 
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The third part of this article situates Lloyd in the context of its 
predecessor R. v. Nur,2 outlining the basic test to be applied. While the 
Court in Lloyd purports to merely apply Nur, it takes an important but 
under-acknowledged step in its construction of one of the reasonable 
hypotheticals used by incorporating offender-specific characteristics into 
its analysis. This novel step illustrates a growing fissure in the Court’s 
jurisprudence on mandatory minimums, whereby the majority and 
dissenting justices differ on their interpretation of the basic parameters 
by which a reasonable hypothetical is to be constructed.  
Having outlined these preliminary positions, the fourth part of the article 
looks at the future of mandatory minimum sentences, and makes three 
claims. First, it addresses the likelihood that Lloyd makes it easier than ever 
to defeat mandatory minimum sentences. The post-Lloyd case law is 
unclear on this point, and observers should be neither overly optimistic nor 
pessimistic about the future of mandatory minimum sentences given the 
inconsistencies in lower court decisions. Second, it argues that Lloyd may 
make it harder for courts to find a section 123 violation given the Chief 
Justice’s explicit connection of Lloyd to R. v. Lacasse, which confirms that 
section 718.2(e)4 and Gladue5 principles are not part of the analysis under 
section 12. The rejection of ‘proportionality’ as a principle of fundamental 
justice and the concretization of ‘gross disproportionality’ thus gives little 
scope for lower courts to incorporate certain fundamental principles of 
sentencing into section 12 analyses.  
Finally, this fourth part of the article examines the impact of this 
ruling on substantive equality concerns, and the Court’s general 
avoidance of substantive equality arguments even where concerns such 
as race seem obvious on the facts of the case. To the extent that 
mandatory minimum sentences are declared of no force and effect under 
section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,6 it appears that enumerated 
or analogous grounds under section 15 of the Charter will have little role 
to play in those decisions. In fact, the ongoing exclusion of substantive 
equality considerations from section 12 jurisprudence makes it less likely 
that a particular mandatory minimum sentence will be declared invalid. 
Arguments that section 12 can be integrated with section 15 in a 
                                                                                                                       
2 [2015] S.C.J. No. 15, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nur”]. 
3 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
4 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
5 R. v. Gladue, [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gladue”]. 
6 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
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meaningful way are hindered by recent judicial changes in the 
construction of proportionality for the purposes of section 12 review; the 
decisions in Lloyd and Safarzadeh-Markali7 are both questionable and 
yet consistent. 
The article ultimately concludes that reactions to Lloyd are both 
premature and overbroad. The future of mandatory minimum sentences 
remains relatively opaque: they are here to stay for some time and for at 
least some offences, but likely not all offences for which they have been 
imposed. While Lloyd has opened up the terms on which reasonable 
hypotheticals might be challenged, it has also suggested a number of 
constraints remain. In particular, those of the view that Lloyd heralds the 
automatic end of mandatory minimums ought to consider the lack of 
attention paid to section 15 substantive equality grounds. The unwillingness 
of the Court to recognize race as a feature in reasonable hypotheticals 
avoids an outcome which would virtually guarantee the end of mandatory 
minimum sentences for at least some offences. Thus, while Lloyd refines 
the Court’s treatment of mandatory minimum sentences, its expansionist 
approach to reasonable hypotheticals stops well short of planting a self-
destruct button in that jurisprudence. 
II. MESSAGING TO PARLIAMENT: EXEMPTIONS & DRAFTING 
Two threads have consistently presented themselves in mandatory 
minimum sentences jurisprudence. First, the Court has continually warned 
Parliament about how mandatory minimum legislation is drafted, asking for 
the provisions to be defined more narrowly. Second, the Court has struggled 
with the idea of using judicially-granted exemptions to preclude the 
application of mandatory minimum sentences in appropriate cases. 
In Lloyd, the Court suggested a statutory exemption scheme as another 
option for insulating mandatory minimum sentences.8 This “residual judicial 
discretion” was described as “a safety valve” that would allow judges the 
ability to grant a lesser sentence in “exceptional cases”.9 As the Court notes, 
such schemes do appear in numerous other jurisdictions, and observers will 
also note that no parameters were explicitly placed on Parliament’s 
discretion in designing such a scheme. Thus, it might be a general statutory 
                                                                                                                       
7 R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, [2016] S.C.J. No. 14, 2016 SCC 14, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 180 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Safarzadeh-Markhali”].  
8 Supra, note 1, at para. 36. 
9 Id. 
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exemption that applied to a range of offences to which mandatory minimum 
sentences attached,10 or it might take the form of an exemption attached to 
every mandatory minimum. The latter has the benefit of allowing Parliament 
to specify the criteria for exercising judicial discretion in respect of any 
given offence, whilst also allowing certain minimums to be automatically 
excluded from the statutory exemption scheme. 
While some commentators have argued in favour of adopting an 
exemption-based model,11 others have suggested that the statutory discretion 
scheme briefly described in Lloyd is functionally the same as the 
constitutional exemption concept rejected in Ferguson,12 and thus vulnerable 
to at least some of the same critiques as the Chief Justice had deployed in 
that case.13 Parliament can reap the political benefits of appearing tough-on-
crime whilst the judiciary bogs itself down in appeals sorting out when 
exemptions might be appropriate (and then, invariably, being criticized as 
judicial activists for handing them out in a way that undermines the tough-
on-crime intent of Parliament). A number of the examples referred to by the 
Court in Lloyd provide little statutory guidance on their face.14 If part of the 
pressing rationales in Ferguson were to insist Parliament take ownership of 
its role as the designer of the sentencing system, and to generate 
predictability in sentencing, a statutory exemption scheme does little to 
assure those outcomes. 
                                                                                                                       
10 Former Minister of Justice and Attorney General Irwin Cotler proposed just such a 
provision in 2015 that applied to all mandatory minimum sentences. See Bill C-669, An Act to 
amend the Criminal Code (independence of the judiciary), 2nd Sess, 41st Parl., 2015 (introduction 
and first reading April 24, 2015). 
11 P. Sankoff, “Constitutional Exemptions: An Ongoing Problem Requiring a Swift 
Resolution” (2003) 36 U.B.C. L. Rev. 231-258, at 233 (referring to the difference between a 
constitutional exemption that is offered during a suspended declaration of invalidity, such as that 
offered to those who sought to benefit from a change to the prohibition against assisted-dying in 
Carter v Canada, [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 (S.C.C.) and ongoing 
exemptions that are applied intermittently in perpetuity because the implicated law is not in fact 
declared invalid). 
12 R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Ferguson”]. 
13 D. Stuart, “Pragmatism and Inconsistency from the Supreme Court on Mandatory 
Minimums” (2016) 27 Criminal Reports (7th) 245 [hereinafter “Stuart”]. 
14 See, e.g., ss. 86E, 102 and 103 of the Sentencing Act, 2002 (NZ), 2002/9 where 
variance from the minimum penalty for murder is permitted if the minimum penalty would be 
“manifestly unjust”, or if the court gives reasons for its decision not to apply life imprisonment; 
s. 53(1)(a) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997 (S Afr), No 105 of 1997 permits a 
variance where the Court records its “substantial and compelling reasons”; ss. 109(3), 110(2) 
and 111(2) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (U.K.), c. 6, which permit 
variance from mandatory minimums for murder, certain drug trafficking offences, and a third 
burglary conviction if the court states for the record the “exceptional circumstances” or 
“particular circumstances” in the case. 
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At the same time, the fact that an exemption would be incorporated 
by statute and not the extraordinary reliance upon questionable judicial 
interpretations of sections 24(1) and 52(1) powers mitigates a number of 
the criticisms. The formalization of discretion through statutorily-
prescribed exemptions reduces the sense of judicial activism that would 
otherwise arise, and lends some predictability as case law develops under 
the ambit of exemptions. Predictability may not be perfect, but it has 
never been so in sentencing; to reject a scheme because of its lack of 
certainty would be to discard wholesale the principles of individualization 
of punishment. 
The other way in which Lloyd sends a clear signal to Parliament on 
statutory design is detached from the question of exemptions: “...If 
Parliament hopes to sustain mandatory minimum penalties for offences 
that cast a wide net, it should consider narrowing their reach so that they 
only catch offenders that merit the mandatory minimum sentences.”15 
Here the Court builds on its minimal impairment arguments in Nur,16 
pushing for more careful attention to be paid to the design not of 
exemptions but of the sentencing provisions themselves. If Parliament is 
unwilling to adopt an exemption scheme for fear that it would lead to 
exemptions becoming the norm, then it must create sentencing provisions 
that are narrowly-defined and restrictive in their scope. At the time of 
writing, Parliament’s response to Lloyd and the rise in the number of 
mandatory minimum sentences remains uncertain.17 
III. THE REASONABLE HYPOTHETICAL TEST IN NUR AND LLOYD 
1. Loose Drafting Defined 
The problem that has been set for Parliament is determining how 
narrowly a statute must be drafted in order to satisfy the Court’s 
directions. The statements of the majority in Lloyd must be compared 
with the actual reasoning in the case, in which the Court used 
                                                                                                                       
15 Supra, note 1, at para. 35. 
16 Supra, note 2, at para. 117: “Parliament could have achieved its objective by drafting an 
offence with a close correspondence between conduct attracting significant moral blameworthiness 
… and the mandatory minimum, rather than a sweeping law…”. 
17 Minister of Justice Jody Wilson-Raybould has promised an all-encompassing review of 
the Criminal Code, including mandatory minimum sentences, but no concrete reforms have been 
undertaken. See, e.g., “Liberals Eye Changes to Mandatory Minimum Sentences”, Canadian Press 
(May 7, 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news>. 
122 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
“reasonable hypotheticals” to rule unconstitutional the mandatory 
minimum sentences attached to what appeared to be the fairly narrowly 
drafted prohibitions of section 5(3)(a)(i)(D) of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act.18 The Chief Justice’s own summary of the offence 
illustrates the specificity:  
To be subject to the mandatory minimum sentence of one year of 
imprisonment, an offender must be convicted of trafficking, or of 
possession for the purpose of trafficking, of either any quantity of a 
Schedule I substance, such as cocaine, heroin or methamphetamine, 
or three kilograms or more of a Schedule II substance, namely 
cannabis: s. 5(3)(a) and (a.1), CDSA. The offender must also have 
been convicted within the previous 10 years of a ‘designated 
substance offence’, which is defined at s. 2(1) of the CDSA as any 
offence under Part I of the CDSA other than simple possession.19 
As the dissenting judges noted, the prohibition appears quite 
particular:20 confined to traffickers of either the most serious drugs,21 or 
of large quantities of less serious drugs, who had been convicted of 
trafficking, importing, exporting or producing a drug within the previous 
decade. That the majority nonetheless found the provision to run afoul of 
repeated admonitions to Parliament to draft offences as narrowly as 
possible points to the difficulty facing legislators in this area.  
The legislation was found to apply to a great deal of offenders who 
might represent a wide range of blameworthiness. For all its specificity, the 
provision treated those who traffick for profit the same as those addicts who 
possess much smaller amounts for sharing in more intimate circumstances: 
with friends, spouses, and other addicts.22 The finding of broad applicability 
also turned in part on the broad definition of “trafficking” under the CDSA 
which includes not just those who sell drugs, but those who “give”, “send”, 
“transfer” or “deliver” drugs. While the delivery of drugs, for example, is 
no doubt integral to the trafficking operation of the “professional drug 
dealer”, McLachlin C.J.C. notes that the definition of trafficking does not 
include considering the motive of the individual or their intent to profit 
from their trafficking.23 Finally, the “designated substance offence” lumps a 
                                                                                                                       
18 S.C. 1996, c. 19 [hereinafter “CDSA”]. 
19 Lloyd, supra, note 1, at para. 6. 
20 Id., at para. 102. 
21 Schedule I to the CDSA includes drugs such as heroin, cocaine, methamphetamines,  
and fentanyl. 
22 Lloyd, supra, note 1, at para. 29. 
23 Id., at para. 30. 
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broad range of conduct together, including the CDSA’s core prohibitions 
against importing, exporting, producing, trafficking or obtaining prohibited 
substances.24 Thus a provision that appears at first sight to be quite specific 
may not actually be so narrow or constrained.  
The majority’s finding of breadth within section 5(3)(a)(i)(D) might be 
criticized for demanding too much of Parliament through its close editorial 
supervision of the statute, as the dissent in Lloyd suggests. However, it might 
also fairly be understood as an indication from the majority that the 
complexity of a statutory provision does not equate to adequate specificity for 
the purposes of section 12 of the Charter. That the provision could have been 
phrased more broadly (for example, by including simple possession as a 
designated substance offence, or by removing the 10-year period for the prior 
conviction) does not mean that it has been phrased in sufficiently narrow 
terms. When determining the breadth of a mandatory minimum sentence, 
judges ought to work out the full implications of the relevant prohibition(s).  
2. General Parameters of Reasonable Hypotheticals 
Part of working through the full implications of the prohibition is 
testing the breadth of not just the conduct it captures, but the 
circumstances it captures and subjects to the mandatory minimum 
sentence. To this end, the natural progression in the section 12 analysis 
has become to construct a reasonable hypothetical — an offender in 
some fact-specific situation — that can test the law. 
In doing this, the Court in Lloyd relied on the section 12 test 
established in a series of cases and most clearly articulated in Nur: 
[A] challenge to a mandatory minimum sentencing provision on the 
ground it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the 
Charter involves two steps. First, the court must determine what 
constitutes a proportionate sentence for the offence having regard to the 
objectives and principles of sentencing in the Criminal Code. Then, the 
court must ask whether the mandatory minimum requires the judge to 
impose a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the fit and 
proportionate sentence. If the answer is yes, the mandatory minimum 
provision is inconsistent with s. 12 and will fall unless justified under s. 1 
of the Charter.25 
                                                                                                                       
24 The “designated substance offences” of ss. 4-10 are the “true crime” provisions of the 
CDSA, but the Act does contain other offences (such as s. 43, for a breach of an administrative order 
under Part V of the CDSA).  
25 Supra, note 2, at para. 46. 
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The second step of the Nur test itself contains two stages. First, the 
court must consider whether it is obligated by the mandatory minimum 
sentence to impose a grossly disproportionate sentence to the specific 
offender before it, having due regard to the factors ordinarily considered 
as part of fashioning a fit and proportionate sentence. In addition, the 
sentencing or reviewing court also has the authority to consider 
constitutional challenges to legislation even in situations where the law 
itself did not violate the rights of the particular offender opposing the 
law.26 In this second stage, the court may consider a “reasonable 
hypothetical” in which the imposition of the mandatory minimum 
“would be grossly disproportionate in reasonably foreseeable cases.”27 
These cases cannot be “marginally imaginable” or “far-fetched”; they 
must reflect “a situation that may reasonably be expected to arise”.28 
There is no requirement for provincial courts to engage in the second 
stage of the test, but the Court in Lloyd clarified that they are permitted 
to do so (whilst lacking the power to declare the law of no force and 
effect under section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982).29 Superior 
courts clearly have the same ability, as well as the added power of 
applying section 52(1), but it is not clear that they are obligated to 
consider reasonable hypotheticals.30 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has 
done so in every situation presented before it, and the growing use of 
reasonable hypotheticals by trial courts suggests that all reviewing courts 
will invariably engage in the analysis of “reasonable hypotheticals”.  
Whether or not a court chooses to apply the entirety of the test, the 
turn to a “reasonable hypothetical” should not automatically lead to 
findings of unconstitutionality. According to the majority in Nur, it “set a 
                                                                                                                       
26 Drawing on the statement of Dickson C.J.C. in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. 
No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 314, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.) that “...[i]t is the nature of the law, 
not the status of the accused, that is in issue” in s. 52 claims. In the specific context of mandatory 
minimums, see Ferguson, supra, note 12, at para. 59: “...[a] claimant who otherwise has standing 
can generally seek a declaration of invalidity under s. 52 on the grounds that a law has 
unconstitutional effects either in his own case or on third parties.” 
27 Nur, supra, note 2, at para. 57. 
28 Id., at para. 56. 
29 Supra, note 1, at paras. 16-18. The Court did not address the question of whether denying 
provincial courts any authority under s. 52(1) would be problematic in that it would require 
duplication of proceedings across multiple trial courts that were not bound by other trial decisions; 
would deny indigent accused persons the ability to benefit from successful s. 12 challenges raised by 
other defendants in other trials; or would permit the Crown to shield a law found to be 
unconstitutional under s. 12, and continue to apply it, by simply failing to appeal unfavourable 
rulings at the trial level. See Factum of the Intervener, Criminal Lawyers Association.  
30 Nur, supra, note 2, at para. 58: “…a court may look … at other reasonably foreseeable 
situations where the impugned law may apply.” (emphasis added)  
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high bar” for finding cruel and unusual punishment under section 12. 
This supposed elevated standard is in keeping with numerous judicial 
pronouncements: that “...[w]e should be careful not to stigmatize every 
disproportionate or excessive sentence as being a constitutional 
violation”;31 that hypotheticals should reflect circumstances that “could 
commonly arise in day-to-day life”;32 and, that any such hypothetical 
analyses should be based on or present facts that are “‘common’ rather 
than ‘extreme’ or ‘far-fetched’.”33 Embedded in this 30-year history is a 
consistent deference towards Parliament’s intent and prerogative in the 
design and imposition of mandatory minimum sentences, one that should 
not be easily overcome by reference to section 12.  
3. Challenging the Reasonable Hypotheticals in Lloyd 
In Nur, as well as in each of its companion cases34 and Lloyd itself, 
this multi-stage analysis manifested as a split result after both stages of 
the second part of the test had been applied. In almost every case, the 
mandatory minimum sentence was held to be appropriate as applied to 
the actual offender(s) challenging the law, whilst also being found more 
generally to violate section 12 under the reasonable hypothetical 
analysis.35 In other words, statutory provisions have consistently been 
declared unconstitutional and of no force and effect under section 52(1) 
of the Constitution notwithstanding the Court’s view that no tangible 
person has been disadvantaged by them. 
Given this disconnect between outcomes in the first and second stages 
of the Nur test, the proper construction of the reasonable hypothetical 
                                                                                                                       
31 R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 at 1072, 40 D.L.R. (4th) 435 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Smith”]. 
32 R. v. Goltz, [1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 at 516, 61 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Goltz”]. 
33 R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, 2000 SCC 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 at para. 33 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morrisey”]. 
34 The constitutionality of s. 95(2)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Criminal Code, supra, note 4, was 
challenged in Nur, supra, note 2, as well as five other cases: R. v. Smickle, [2013] O.J. No. 5070, 
2013 ONCA 678, 304 C.C.C. (3d) 371 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Smickle”]; R. v. Rocheleau, [2013] 
O.J. No. 5137, 2013 ONCA 679, 311 O.A.C. 295 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Chambers, [2013] O.J. No. 
5116, 2013 ONCA 680, 311 O.A.C. 307 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Charles, [2013] O.J. No. 5115, 2013 
ONCA 681, 117 O.R. (3d) 456 (Ont. C.A.); and R. v. Meszaros, [2013] O.J. No. 5113, 2013 ONCA 
682, 309 C.C.C. (3d) 392 (Ont. C.A.). Of the six cases, only Smickle was decided on the basis that 
the mandatory minimum was excessive as applied to Mr. Smickle himself. Overall, only Charles and 
Nur were granted leave to appeal; the two cases were heard together at the Supreme Court.  
35 One notable exception being Smickle, id., at paras. 31-33.  
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takes on central importance. The requirement of reasonable foreseeability 
and the aversion to “marginal” or “far-fetched” all are intended to 
prevent the construction of reasonable hypotheticals that automatically 
produce grossly disproportionate sentences and therefore negate virtually 
every mandatory minimum: “...This excludes using personal features to 
construct the most innocent and sympathetic case imaginable … the 
inquiry must be grounded in common sense and experience.”36 
At the same time, “personal characteristics cannot be entirely 
excluded”37 from the analysis. In Nur, the impugned law imposed a 
minimum sentence of three or five years on an offender convicted of 
possessing prohibited loaded firearms. Mr. Nur and Mr. Charles did not 
benefit from the Court’s declaration of invalidity of subsection 95(2)(a)(i) 
and (ii) of the Criminal Code because they both possessed weapons in 
circumstances more akin to “truly criminal conduct”.38 Yet the Court was 
concerned about the reasonably foreseeable “licensed and responsible 
gun owner” who improperly and unwittingly stored a licensed weapon in 
a manner that infringed the statute:39 “...The bottom line is that s. 95(1) 
foreseeably catches licensing offences which involve little or no moral 
fault and little or no danger to the public.”40  
The decision in Lloyd is controversial in part because it relies on a highly 
specific and sympathetic accused person as part of the reasonable 
hypothetical, individualized beyond the generic licensed and responsible gun 
owner or unprepared inheritor41 envisaged in Nur. Two hypotheticals were 
relied upon to show the gross disproportionality occasioned by the law. In 
the first, an addict might be sentenced to the mandatory minimum of one 
year imprisonment for sharing a small amount of a Schedule I drug such as 
cocaine with a friend or spouse, nine years after receiving her only other 
criminal conviction for sharing marijuana at a party.42 Here, the minimal 
moral blameworthiness of sharing plays a key role in the majority’s 
declaration that a year in prison would be shocking to Canadians.43 
                                                                                                                       
36 Nur, supra, note 2, at para. 75. In the same paragraph, the majority warned that in the 
absence of such constraints, “almost any mandatory minimum could be argued to violate s. 12 and 
lawyerly ingenuity would be the only limit to findings of unconstitutionality.” 
37 Id., at para. 74. 
38 To use the phrasing of Doherty J.A. in R. v. Nur, [2013] O.J. No. 5120, 2013 ONCA 677, 
117 O.R. (3d) 401, at para. 51 (Ont. C.A.). 
39 Nur, supra, note 2, at para. 82.  
40 Id., at para. 83. 
41 Id. 
42 Lloyd, supra, note 1, at para. 32.  
43 Id. 
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The second reasonable hypothetical is more involved, involving a 
drug addict whose activities fall closer to the professional drug dealing of 
a stereotypical trafficker: 
...A drug addict with a prior conviction for trafficking is convicted of a 
second offence. In both cases, he was only trafficking in order to 
support his own addiction. Between conviction and the sentencing, he 
goes to a rehabilitation centre and conquers his addiction. He comes to 
the sentencing court asking for a short sentence that will allow him to 
resume a healthy and productive life.44 
According to the Court, imposing a one-year sentence on this 
vulnerable but rehabilitated offender would “shock the conscience of 
Canadians.”45 
The majority’s construction of hypotheticals in this case is the source 
of deep controversy. First, as the dissenting opinion points out, these 
circumstances sound very similar to that of Mr. Lloyd himself, who had 
already conceded that the minimum sentence was appropriate in his 
circumstances.46 Mr. Lloyd was described by the sentencing judge as a 
low-level drug dealer who trafficked to support his own addiction. Lloyd 
had engaged in some nascent attempts at rehabilitation between the two 
relevant convictions that triggered the mandatory minimum sentence, 
and requested a sentence of three to four months.47 How then could a 
reasonable hypothetical based on essentially the same facts lead to a 
finding of gross disproportionality? 
Ironically, given the clear signals to Parliament to draft legislation 
carefully, specifically, and narrowly, the answer would seem to lie in a 
relatively lax approach to defining the hypothetical and distinguishing it 
from Lloyd himself. At the time of his arrest, Lloyd was carrying three 
different Schedule I drugs — cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine. 
His prior conviction had been for possession of methamphetamine for the 
purpose of trafficking, and he had been released about one month before 
the arrest that exposed him to the mandatory minimum sentence. In 
addition, Lloyd was convicted of five further offences after this, 
including for several possession offences.48 By contrast, the majority’s 
hypothetical tweaks the facts of Lloyd’s situation (although it does not 
                                                                                                                       
44 Id., at para. 33. 
45 Id. 
46 Id., at para. 25. 
47 R. v. Lloyd, [2014] B.C.J. No. 274, 2014 BCPC 8, at paras. 18-22, 29-33 (B.C. Prov. Ct.). 
48 Id. 
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explicitly say so) into a more sympathetic circumstance where the 
offender has successfully completed a rehabilitation program (as opposed 
to tentatively investigated one) and presumably lacks the extensive 
criminal record of Lloyd.  
More clarity on this point might have strengthened the utility of that 
example, but the two reasonable hypotheticals employed by the majority 
nonetheless raise valid questions about the section 12 process. Is the 
situation of the hypothetical drug addict so close to the facts of the 
instant case as to suggest that there is nothing grossly disproportionate 
about the sentence imposed?49 Or, does this adjustment of the facts of 
Lloyd violate the requirement that the reasonable hypothetical be 
reasonably foreseeable, neither marginal nor far-fetched? For example, 
would the offender in that situation even receive the second conviction, 
the one that triggers the mandatory minimum sentence, or would he be 
diverted into a drug treatment program that would preclude a conviction 
if successfully completed?  
The majority’s response is that such schemes are insufficient to 
insulate the law from section 12 review: such programs are unavailable 
in most jurisdictions, and may be inaccessible even where they exist; 
admission usually requires a guilty plea and waiver of the right to a fair 
trial; such programs are onerous for heavily addicted accused; and, 
finally, the Crown generally retains the discretion to disqualify 
individuals from participation. For the majority, Crown discretion cannot 
operate as a constitutional protection against grossly disproportionate 
punishment;50 for the dissent, relying on Goltz,51 where the described 
conduct might constitute a lesser or different offence, then it cannot 
constitute a reasonable hypothetical. There is no mention made here of 
the role of Crown discretion in charging decisions, even though 
presumably it is that discretion which shields the offender.  
In addition, how much emphasis is to be placed on reasonable 
hypotheticals developed from reported cases? On this last point, the 
dissenting opinion argues that the first hypothetical, of the offender who 
shares, is not reasonable because either that offender would not suffer the 
first conviction (which could be construed as joint possession of 
                                                                                                                       
49 Lloyd, supra, note 1, at para. 100. 
50 Id., at para. 34, citing Nur, supra, note 2, at 94. 
51 Goltz, supra, note 32 (deciding that a mandatory minimum sentence of seven days’ 
imprisonment for driving with a suspended licence did not violate s. 12, and that the reasonable 
hypothetical posed by the respondent-offender would not arise because it is almost certain that the 
hypothetical accused would succeed with a defence of necessity and therefore not be convicted). 
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marijuana depending, one supposes, on the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion), or because there are very few cases where repeat offenders 
have no other intervening convictions. Contrary to established cases on 
section 12, she would be the most sympathetic offender imaginable52 — 
presumably in part because of her awful luck.  
IV. THE FUTURE OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS 
For some commentators, Lloyd is the logical conclusion of section 12 
jurisprudence and the reasonable hypothetical analysis: that the Court’s 
warning about making it too easy to construct a sympathetic reasonable 
hypothetical was one that would be overtaken by the laxity that would be 
applied to the constraints of “far-fetched” and “marginally imaginable”.53 
Certainly the unwillingness to find unconstitutionality on the basis of the 
first stage of the test might reflect the “high bar” promised in Nur. Yet for at 
least three reasons it is perhaps premature to suggest that the second stage 
of the test will lead to automatic eliminations of mandatory minimum 
sentences: judges have exhibited mixed tendencies in utilizing section 12; 
the Supreme Court’s accumulated rulings on proportionality in the 
sentencing context justify precluding the consideration of factors that would 
ordinarily be relevant to determining a fit sentence; and, continuing judicial 
reluctance to adapt arguably the most powerful tool of resistance to 
mandatory minimum sentences, the disparate impacts generated by them 
not for individuals but for historically disadvantaged groups. 
1. Judicial Practice 
First, the actual response of the judiciary to the Court’s interpretation 
of reasonable hypotheticals in Lloyd has been mixed, just as it was after 
Smith and its successor cases up to and including Nur. Some mandatory 
minimum sentences are struck down, and others are not, suggesting that 
                                                                                                                       
52 Id., at paras. 89-95.  
53 See, e.g., Stuart, supra, note 13, (that post-Lloyd and Nur, “many of the 60 or mandatory 
minimums should fall”); W.K. Gorman, “The Death of Mandatory Minimum Periods of Imprisonment in 
Canada” (2016) 52:3 Court Review 96, at 99 (“Nur and Lloyd appear to have taken an approach  
that suggests mandatory minimum periods of imprisonment will be consistently declared to be 
unconstitutional in Canada”); and, Lincoln Caylor and Gannon G. Beaulne, Parliamentary Restrictions 
on Judicial Discretion in Sentencing: A Defence of Mandatory Minimum Sentences (Ottawa: Macdonald-
Laurier Institute, 2014) at 19 (warning that “the gross disproportionality test is a discretionary analysis 
left in the hands of the Canadian judiciary … it could quickly become a means through which judges can 
usurp Parliament’s power to enact valid criminal sentences…”).  
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lower court judges are finding a balance between Parliament’s intent and 
the flexibility afforded by cases such as Nur and Lloyd. This should not 
be surprising. After all, the decision and tests outlined in Nur are 
grounded in Smith, Morrisey and Latimer,54 amongst others. Only in 
Smith was the law declared unconstitutional; in the other two cases, the 
appellate courts overturned lower court declarations of invalidity.  
While lower courts have struck down some mandatory minimums,55 
including on the basis of Lloyd,56 they have preserved them in respect of 
other offences even as the law on reasonable hypotheticals evolved. In Li,57 
the court upheld the constitutionality of section 7(2)(b)(iii) of the CDSA.58 
In the post-Lloyd cases of McIntyre59 and McIvor,60 a mandatory minimum 
sentence of five years for armed robbery was upheld.61 In Oud,62 the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal overturned a lower court decision that had found 
section 244.2(3)(b) of the Criminal Code63 to be unconstitutional. In that 
case, the appellate court explicitly used Lloyd as the basis for determining 
the provision was in fact constitutional.64 As they have for the last several 
years, predictions about the floodgates of unconstitutionality findings 
remain unproven even after Lloyd.  
2. Gross Disproportionality as Applied to the Accused 
While it may be argued that Lloyd has changed prior understandings 
of the reasonable hypothetical for the purposes of the second stage of  
the section 12 analysis, Lloyd has not fundamentally altered the first 
stage of the test. Courts have regularly (but not always) failed to consider 
                                                                                                                       
54 R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, 2001 SCC 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) (upholding 
the mandatory minimum punishment for murder and refusing to allow a constitutional exemption). 
55 For pre-Lloyd cases, see R. v. R. (E.R.D.), [2016] B.C.J. No. 774, 2016 BCSC 684 
(B.C.S.C.); R. v. Badali, [2016] O.J. No. 544, 2016 ONSC 788 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Flaro, [2014] O.J. 
No. 94, 2014 ONCJ 2 (Ont. C.J.). 
56 In R. v. Dickey, [2016] B.C.J. No. 815, 2016 BCCA 177, 335 C.C.C. (3d) 478 
(B.C.C.A.), the Court predictably struck down s. 5(3)(a)(ii)(A) and (C) of the CDSA, which were 
parallel provisions to s. 5(3)(a)(ii)(D), which was ruled unconstitutional in Lloyd.  
57 R. v. Li, [2016] O.J. No. 1371, 2016 ONSC 1757 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
58 Imposing a one-year minimum for growing between 201 and 500 marijuana plants. 
59 R. v. McIntyre, [2017] O.J. No. 178, 2017 ONSC 360, 2017 CarswellOnt 342 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
60 R. v. McIvor, [2017] M.J. No. 52, 2017 MBPC 11, 2017 CarswellMan 64 (Man. Prov. 
Ct.) [hereinafter “McIvor”]. 
61 Under s. 344(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, supra, note 4. 
62 R. v. Oud, [2016] B.C.J. No. 1589, 2016 BCCA 332, 339 C.C.C. (3d) 379 (B.C.C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Oud”]. 
63 Imposing a minimum four-year sentence for the reckless discharge of a firearm. 
64 Oud, supra, note 62, at paras. 32 et seq., 43-44. 
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section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code,65 in their assessment of whether a 
mandatory minimum is grossly disproportionate in a particular case. 
Section 718.2(e) requires that a sentencing judge consider all measures 
short of incarceration when fashioning a fit sentence for an accused, 
paying “particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal 
offenders.”66 The fact that the introduction of this provision did little to 
ameliorate the over-representation of Indigenous accused and offenders 
in the criminal justice system was noted by the Supreme Court in its 
decision in Gladue.67 There, the Court described this over-representation 
as “a crisis in the Canadian criminal justice system”,68 and mandated that 
all sentencing courts apply a new framework to Indigenous offenders in 
order to determine “whether an aboriginal offender will go to jail or 
whether other sentencing options may be employed which will play 
perhaps a stronger role in restoring a sense of balance to the offender, 
victim, and community, and in preventing future crime.”69  
Yet Gladue has done little to remedy the problem it was intended to 
address, as Indigenous rates of imprisonment have increased even as 
imprisonment rates for non-Indigenous offenders decline.70 The situation 
that was described as a “crisis” in Gladue saw Indigenous adults making up 
12 per cent of federal inmate admissions. By 2005, that number had risen to 
17 per cent.71 In 2014 to 2015, the number was 25 per cent, even though 
Indigenous adults were only three per cent of the general population.72  
A similar phenomenon can be identified with respect to African-Canadians. 
According to the Correctional Investigator of Canada, the federal inmate 
                                                                                                                       
65 Supra, note 4. 
66 Id. 
67 Supra, note 5. 
68 Id., at para. 64. 
69 Id., at para. 65. 
70 R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] S.C.J. No. 13, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, at paras. 61-63 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ipeelee”]. See also J. Rudin, “Aboriginal Over-representation and R. v. 
Gladue: Where We Were, Where We Are and Where We Might Be Going” (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
687-713 (suggesting that the reason for this disparity is rooted in part in the lack of competence of 
courts and lawyers to gather appropriate information about an offender and his or her circumstances 
before fashioning a sentence).  
71 Ipeelee, id., at para. 62. 
72 According to Justice Canada, 26 per cent of provincial/territorial inmates in 2014 to 2015 
were Indigenous. The imbalance was more pronounced for Indigenous women, who were 
imprisoned at a rate 12 times that of their representation in the general population. Indigenous youth 
were imprisoned at a rate five times that of their representation in the general population. Youth 
were 37 per cent of admissions, but only seven per cent of the general population. Justice Canada – 
Research and Statistics Division, “Indigenous overrepresentation in the criminal justice system” 
(Jan. 2017), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/jf-pf/2017/jan02.html>.  
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population grew by 10 per cent between 2005 and 2015; in that time, the 
African-Canadian inmate population grew by 69 per cent.73  
The question remains whether consideration of section 718.2(e) would 
make a tangible difference to some sentences. Ryan Newell74 argues that in 
at least some cases, a significant disparity can be identified. In Bouchard,75 
an accused received a sentence of four months after a pre-sentence report 
and application of the Gladue framework; that same offence is now subject 
to a mandatory minimum sentence of two years.76 It would be difficult to 
argue that a mandatory minimum that is five times longer than the imposed 
sentence is not grossly disproportionate.  
Notwithstanding Parliamentary and judicial pronouncements on the 
importance of section 718.2(e) and Gladue, both frameworks are noticeably 
absent from the mandatory minimum sentence jurisprudence, and have 
been for many years.77 There is no mention made of Gladue at all in Nur, 
Lloyd, or Ferguson, and section 718.2(e) is only referenced when the 
dissenting opinion in Lloyd attempts to justify the ability of mandatory 
minimums to override competing sentencing principles.78 It is no surprise 
then that the failure to fully consider section 718.2(e) and Gladue is often 
apparent in section 12 challenges to mandatory minimum sentences. In 
Bressette,79 Desotti J. acknowledged that his sentencing discretion had been 
only partially fettered by the mandatory minimum to be applied to the 
Indigenous offender before him. Yet he neither applied the reasonable 
hypothetical analysis nor considered the offender’s Indigenous status in 
assessing the constitutionality of the provision.80 Similar analyses took 
place in Sheppard81 and in McIvor,82 where the trial judge mentioned the 
Indigenous status of the offender but did not refer to it in assessing the 
constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence.  
                                                                                                                       
73 H. Sapers, 11th Annual Report of the Correctional Investigator of Canada 2014-2015 
(June 26, 2015), online: <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/annrpt/annrpt20142015-eng.aspx>. 
74 R. Newell, “Making Matters Worse: the Safe Streets and Communities Act and the 
Ongoing Crisis of Indigenous Over-Incarceration” (2013) 51 Osgoode Hall L.J. 199-249. 
75 R. v. Bouchard, [2012] O.J. No. 3131, 2012 ONCJ 425 (Ont. C.J.). 
76 Section 5(3)(a)(ii)(C) of the CDSA, supra, note 18, as amended by the Safe Streets and 
Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1.  
77 Larry Chartrand expresses concern about some judges not addressing these concepts as 
early as 2001. L.N. Chartrand, “Aboriginal Peoples and Mandatory Sentencing” (2001) 39 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 449-467. 
78 Lloyd, supra, note 1, at para. 103. 
79 R. v. Bressette, [2010] O.J. No. 3741, 2010 ONSC 3831 (Ont. S.C.J.).  
80 The judge did note that the mandatory minimum set a new floor for punishment, and that 
the illegal use of firearms was a danger to Indigenous communities. 
81 R. v. Sheppard, [2011] N.J. No. 252, 241 C.R.R. (2d) 14, 2011 CanLII 41607 (N.L. Prov. Ct.). 
82 Supra, note 60.  
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It is unclear that the assessment of these factors in any particular 
offender’s case would lead to a finding of gross disproportionality, but it 
is clear that — given the desire to find appropriate non-carceral 
sentences that animates both section 718.2(e) and Gladue — those 
concepts tend to promote such a finding in the face of a requirement to 
imprison any and all offenders. In defending the ability of Parliament to 
introduce legislation that explicitly sought to prevent the application of 
other statutory and fundamental rules of sentencing, McLachlin C.J.C. 
declared that Parliament could balance denunciation, deterrence and 
other goals through mandatory minimums.83  
This is a slightly different position than that staked out in the 
dissenting opinion of Gascon J. that she joined in Lacasse.84 There, the 
justices first reflected the reasons in Ipeelee that proportionality requires 
considering parity alongside proportionality (including the offender’s 
degree of responsibility),85 and then described as over-simplistic the 
near-automatic reversion to imprisonment when Parliament chose to 
emphasize denunciation and deterrence:  
...In my view, the courts should not automatically assume that 
imprisonment is always the preferred sanction for the purpose of meeting 
these objectives. To do so would be contrary to other sentencing 
principles. Rather, a court must consider ‘all available sanctions, other 
than imprisonment’, that are reasonable in the circumstances: s. 718.2(e) 
Cr. C.; Gladue, at para. 36.86  
To the extent that these factors are not considered in the first branch 
of the section 12 test, the ability to challenge mandatory minimum 
sentences is weakened. 
3. Personal Characteristics and Reasonable Hypotheticals after 
Lloyd 
One reason that the floodgates might be seen as far from open is that 
not only has the Supreme Court largely neglected to take up the issue, 
but it has also explicitly disavowed its own comments in recent cases 
                                                                                                                       
83 Lloyd, supra, note 1, at para. 45. 
84 R. v. Lacasse, [2015] S.C.J. No. 64, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Lacasse”]. In fairness to the Chief Justice, Gascon J. did not acknowledge his Lacasse 
dissent either when he joined Wagner and Brown JJ. in writing the dissent in Lloyd. 
85 Id., at para. 131 (dissenting reasons of Gascon J.). 
86 Id., at para. 132.  
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about proportionality in sentencing. In Ipeelee, writing on the sentencing of 
two Indigenous offenders, the Court unanimously agreed87 that the failure 
of a sentencing judge to take into account systemic and background factors 
“would violate the fundamental principle of sentencing — that the sentence 
must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of 
responsibility of the offender.”88 Writing for the majority, LeBel J. said 
“[p]roportionality is the sine qua non of a just sanction” and “could aptly be 
described as a principle of fundamental justice”.89 
These phrases were then adopted by the Court in its unanimous 
decision in Anderson,90 only to be dismissed in Lloyd and Safarzadeh-
Markhali on the basis that adopting proportionality under section 7 of the 
Charter would lead to a lower standard than that of section 12 review, 
and therefore subsume section 12 into section 7 for these purposes.91 This 
certainly raises a coherence problem, but surely it asks the wrong 
question. Rather than focusing on whether this is a formal disconnect 
between section 7 and section 12, or whether one renders the other 
redundant, perhaps the Court should have returned its attention to the 
question of whether gross disproportionality is or was ever the correct 
standard for section 12 review.  
One consequence of insisting on gross disproportionality as the 
appropriate standard for constitutional review — and negating the 
availability of proportionality simpliciter — is that it excludes the ability 
of judges to craft sentences that consider proportionality in its full 
substantive sense: that connect the sentence imposed to the moral 
blameworthiness of the offender, and consider the appropriateness of the 
sentence in the context of that particular offender. Mandatory minimum 
sentences focus on the question of whether like offences are receiving 
like sentences, bypassing key components of proportionality — the 
offender and her circumstances — entirely, contrary to the warning of 
LeBel J. in Ipeelee that “...[c]ourts must ensure that a formalistic 
approach to parity in sentencing does not undermine the remedial 
purpose of s. 718.2(e).”92 The emphasis on parity, and its associated 
prioritization of denunciation and the seriousness of the offence as  
                                                                                                                       
87 Justice Rothstein dissented in part, but not on these points: Ipeelee, supra, note 70. 
88  Id., at para. 73 (emphasis in original). 
89 Id., at paras. 37 and 36. 
90 R. v. Anderson, [2014] S.C.J. No. 41, 2014 SCC 41, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167, at para. 21 
(S.C.C.). In that case, the Court rejected the idea that proportionality required not just judges but also 
the Crown to consider Gladue principles. 
91 Lloyd, supra, note 1, at paras. 40-42.  
92 Ipeelee, supra, note 70, at para. 79. 
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near-determinative factors undermines the substantive equality-generating 
provisions of both section 718.2(e) and Gladue. 
As noted above, this exclusion often appears in the first stage of the 
section 12 test, but it also reproduces itself in the design of reasonable 
hypotheticals under the second branch. In none of its section 12 reasonable 
hypothetical jurisprudence has the Court considered Indigenous status or 
race or any other sort of historical disadvantage that might be relevant in the 
ordinary sentencing analysis. In Nur, Doherty J.A. writing for a panel of five 
judges at the Ontario Court of Appeal, dismissed the section 15 argument in 
one paragraph by adopting the trial judge’s reasons on the point.93  
The argument of Code J. at trial in Nur was essentially that there was 
no section 15 claim to be made because the law itself was facially neutral 
and did not cause the disproportionate application of the law to Black 
males.94 From this view, the application of the law being discriminatory 
says nothing about whether the law itself needs to be remedied. Without 
going into the merits of this position as a section 15 argument, it is 
important to note that causation has little role to play in section 718.2(e) 
and Gladue arguments about proportionality in sentencing.95 There, the 
fact of over-representation is the crisis to be ameliorated,96 and the 
appropriate sentence for the individual is contextualized by her 
experiences as a member of a particular over-represented community and 
her associated historical disadvantage.97 Ipeelee was a concerted 
reminder to sentencing judges that section 718.2(e) needs to be 
considered in all cases, especially those involving Indigenous offenders, 
even when the offence is serious.98 Regardless of the state of the law on 
section 15, section 12 is agnostic as to the cause of the disproportionate 
effect; it is concerned only with the ability of the sentencing judge to 
provide some remedy through crafting a fully proportionate sentence.99  
                                                                                                                       
93 R. v. Nur, [2013] O.J. No. 5120, 2013 ONCA 677, 117 O.R. (3d) 401, at para. 182 (Ont. 
C.A.): “I agree with the analysis and conclusion of the trial judge at paras. 74-82. There is no breach 
of s. 15.”  
94 R. v. Nur, [2011] O.J. No. 3878, 2011 ONSC 4874, 275 C.C.C. (3d) 330, at paras. 78-79 
(Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Nur (S.C.J.)”].  
95 Gladue, supra, note 5, at para. 65; Ipeelee, supra, note 70, at para. 61. 
96 Ipeelee, supra, note 70, at para. 56. 
97 Id., at para. 60. 
98 Id., at paras. 85-87 (referring to the “unwarranted emphasis” placed on the Court’s 
statement in Gladue that there is less likely to be a sentence adjustment when the conviction is for a 
serious crime).  
99 See also J. Rudin and K. Roach, “Broken Promises: A Response to Stenning and Roberts’ 
‘Empty Promises’” (2002), 65 Sask. L. Rev. 3-34 (that it would be illogical to argue that s. 718.2(e) can 
only be effective to the extent that sentencing practices cause the over-representation to be remedied). 
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To the extent that mandatory minimums exclude the consideration of 
these factors — and to be clear, minimum sentences make non-custodial 
sentences statutorily impermissible — then the fundamental principle of 
proportionality is clearly violated.  
The explanation of how proportionality has become diluted for the 
purposes of section 12 is a multi-faceted one. Jamie Cameron is right to 
point out that the turn to section 7 as a means of asserting substantive and 
not merely procedural rights set the stage for weakening other substantive 
rights and denying them the robust application they otherwise ought to 
have developed.100 Yet the diminution of proportionality is also the product 
of several other forces that in large part originate with a Court that has not 
only acquiesced to Parliamentary assertiveness that reduces judicial 
discretion in sentencing by making some features of proportionality 
inaccessible but also actively enabled that circumscription. 
The first of these features is in some ways the most contested in the 
context of mandatory minimum sentences. Notwithstanding that several 
mandatory minimums have been declared unconstitutional, the Supreme 
Court has arguably been overly deferential to Parliament in its imposition 
of mandatory minimum sentences. At no point has the Court declared 
that mandatory minimum sentences are inherently problematic because 
they conflict with fundamental sentencing principles. Rather, the Court 
has gone out of its way to advise Parliament on how to better craft 
mandatory minimums in order to protect them from constitutional 
review. To be fair, advising Parliament on the constitutionality of 
legislation is part of the Court’s job, but as part of this the Court has also 
declared that Parliament has the general power to fetter judicial 
discretion through minimum sentences. 
Second, this erosion of judicial discretion has been enabled by 
judicial pronouncements on the scope and strength of proportionality as a 
foundational concept of sentencing. This extends beyond the decision to 
anoint gross disproportionality as the constitutional standard for section 12 
review, and includes the retrenchment from ordinary principles of 
sentencing review. In R. v. M. (C.A.) and a number of subsequent cases 
spanning nearly two decades, the Court averred that errors in principle 
could justify judicial review of a lower court’s sentencing determination 
even in the absence of evidence that the sentence itself was demonstrably 
                                                                                                                       
100 J. Cameron, “Fault and Punishment under Sections 7 and 12 of the Charter” (2008), 40 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 553-592. 
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unfit.101 This confirmed the importance of not only the ultimate penalty 
itself when determining the propriety of a sentence, but the importance of 
ensuring that all relevant factors were taken into consideration when that 
penalty was being shaped; this is proportionality in its fullest sense. 
However, there has been a clear retreat from this position in recent 
times, most notably in Lacasse. In that case, the dissenting opinion of 
McLachlin C.J.C. and Gascon J. reiterated the M. (C.A.) principle,102 but 
was overridden by Wagner J.’s declaration that intervention was only 
justified if the error in principle or failure to consider relevant factors 
would have had affected the ultimate sentence.103 Here, the Court  
takes an important step towards subordinating the right process of 
determining a sentence. This includes by implication the failure to attend to 
section 718.2(e). The difficulty is assessing how such a failure impacts on 
the final disposition when central features are unknown to the sentencing 
judge, and are unobtainable by the reviewing court that is forced to 
assess fitness based on a limited record. The wealth of information that 
goes into an appropriate Gladue report, for example, would seem 
profoundly important to determining if the ultimate disposition is an 
appropriate one. Being able to intervene even where it is not apparent  
on its face that the sentence is itself out of line takes on renewed 
importance in such circumstances. By moving away from a robust 
enforcement of sentencing principles in a holistic sense, the Court 
validates Parliamentary processes that formally preclude holistic and 
individualized sentencing. 
Finally, the Court participates in Parliamentary depredation of 
proportionality under section 12 through the very tangible ways in which 
it constructs reasonable hypotheticals. One of the curious features of 
Lloyd is that it presents a very personalized offender in its second 
hypothetical involving a rehabilitated drug addict. This is curious 
because of the lack of attention otherwise paid to similar circumstances 
in other cases, particularly Nur. In Nur, Code J. not only failed to 
account for the accused’s status as a young Black man charged with an 
offence for which African-Canadians were disproportionately charged in 
                                                                                                                       
101 [1996] S.C.J. No. 28, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, 105 C.C.C. (3d) 327, at para. 90 (S.C.C.). See 
also, R. v. McDonell, [1997] S.C.J. No. 42, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 948, 145 D.L.R. (4th) 577, at para. 17 
(S.C.C.); R. v. L.M., [2008] S.C.J. No. 31, 2008 SCC 31, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 163, at paras. 14-15 
(S.C.C.); and R. v. Nasogalauk, [2010] S.C.J. No. 6, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at para. 46 
(S.C.C.). 
102 Supra, note 84, at paras. 135-143. 
103 Id., at para. 43. 
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Toronto,104 he also justified his dismissal of this feature on the basis that 
it could apply broadly to challenge a range of criminal laws: 
The s. 15 arguments advanced by the Applicant and the Intervener 
could be made in relation to any provision of the Criminal Code that 
results in mandatory imprisonment, for example, the sentence for the 
offence of murder. If disproportionate numbers of blacks are charged 
with murder because of the discriminatory impact of poverty, 
unemployment, poor housing and biased law enforcement decisions, 
would it be appropriate to strike down the mandatory minimum penalty 
for murder? Obviously not.105 
With respect, Code J.’s analogy between drug and gun possession 
offences on the one hand, and murder on the other, seems to unfairly 
stretch the applicant’s section 15 arguments in Nur, especially given that 
Gladue had already suggested that in the context of sentencing, the 
violence of the offence points towards a higher sentence. 
More importantly, it is not clear why these systemic and background 
factors would not be relevant for the purposes of section 12 (assuming they 
are not relevant for section 15). If anything, the opposite conclusion to that 
of Code J. ought to be reached — that mandatory minimums are in need of 
revision if they contribute to and exacerbate gross over-representation for 
both African-Canadian and Indigenous persons.106 In Borde, for example, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal suggested that the African-Canadian accused 
might be able to make Gladue arguments on the basis of similar systemic 
and background factors to Indigenous offenders.107  
Of telling relevance is the manner in which the hypothetical in Nur 
was constructed, and the way in which Nur’s own personal factors were 
not taken into account. In Nur, the Court ruled the provision 
unconstitutional because it might capture relatively innocent licensing 
offences — a conscientious, responsible gun owner who makes an error 
as to the statutory requirements for the proper storage of his licensed, 
legal firearm. It would be grossly disproportionate to his blameworthiness 
                                                                                                                       
104 Faced with evidence that approximately 62 per cent of s. 95 charges were laid against 
African-Canadians even though they made up only 8.4 per cent of the population, Code J. did 
acknowledge that the evidence before him showed “undoubtedly [that] a disproportionately high 
number” of African-Canadians were charged. Nur (S.C.J.), supra, note 94, at paras. 76-77. 
105 Id., at para. 80. 
106 See notes 70-73, above. 
107 R. v. Borde, [2003] O.J. No. 354, 63 O.R. (3d) 417, 2003 CanLII 4187, at para. 27 (Ont. 
C.A.). See also R. v. Hamilton, [2003] O.J. No. 532, 172 C.C.C. (3d) 114, 8 C.R. (6th) 215 (Ont. 
S.C.J.), affd [2004] O.J. No. 3252, 72 O.R. (3d) 1, 186 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (Ont. C.A.).  
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if failing to properly lock an ammunition box could lead to a three-year 
sentence of imprisonment for this offender.  
Left unsaid was that the “reasonable hypothetical” that the Court drew 
upon was no hypothetical. It was based, as the dissenting judges noted, 
on the actual case of John Snobelen, the former Minister of Education 
and then-Natural Resources Minister of Ontario. Snobelen was brought 
to the attention of police when his ex-wife noted the existence of an 
unlicensed firearm that was shipped to his Canadian home from his 212-
acre ranch in Oklahoma. Snobelen had sold his ranch, forgotten about the 
gun that was there when it was shipped, and then forgotten to dispose of 
it once he received it in Canada. He was charged with a summary 
offence, pleaded guilty under the provision and provided character 
references, with reference also made to his public service; he ultimately 
received an absolute discharge.108 
This hypothetical, stripped of its context and history, abstracted and 
re-presented as a neutral construct, formed the basis of the section 12 
violation in Nur. Yet no regard was given to the seemingly relevant 
circumstances of Nur himself: a 19-year old refugee from Somalia; who 
lived in an overcrowded townhouse with his parents and eight siblings; 
who escaped a war and, from the time he was six, lived in one of 
Toronto’s most notoriously crime-ridden neighbourhoods where he 
nonetheless excelled; described by a teacher as “‘an exceptional student 
and athlete who excelled in the classroom and on the basketball court … 
an incredible youth with unlimited academic and great leadership 
skills’”; and, described by his employer as “professional, punctual, 
creative … [with] role model characteristics”; with no criminal record, 
and no indication as to how he came to possess the gun he was found 
with;109 and no recognition that for the particular offence he was 
eventually charged with, there was clear evidence of disproportionate 
charging of Blacks.  
None of this is to say that Snobelen and Nur are equivalent 
individuals enmeshed in equivalent circumstances, only that the idea that 
one’s case constitutes a reasonable hypothetical and another one does not 
is a matter in need of greater justification. Yet none has been forthcoming 
from the Court on this point about how to personalize the characteristics 
                                                                                                                       
108 R. v. Snobelen, [2008] O.J. No. 6021 (Ont. C.J.). 
109 Justice Code further noted that the Crown had not proven if Nur possessed the gun before 
he arrived at the site of his arrest, when he joined a group of young men outside the site of his arrest, 
or if he participated in any of the threatening acts of those other young men present at the time (and 
which had precipitated a call to the police). Nur (S.C.J.), supra, note 94, at paras. 34, 61. 
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of the offender in the reasonable hypothetical. As noted above, the Court 
has yet to develop a hypothetical that takes into account the Indigenous 
or racialized identity of the offender. Having acknowledged in Nur the 
need to admit some personal characteristics of the hypothetical offender 
as long as they did not produce remote or far-fetched examples,110 the 
majority in Lloyd eschewed the opportunity to clarify this central 
question. Indeed, the majority in Lloyd made no reference to personal 
characteristics even as it mapped out the life of a hypothetical drug 
addicted dealer who rehabilitated himself.  
It is of interest that no majority of the Court has ever included race or 
Indigenous status as a part of the reasonable hypothetical in spite of 
proven over-representation patterns. Speaking generously, only twice has 
race been referenced in the Court’s reasonable hypothetical opinions, and 
on both of those occasions it was the dissenting justices who raised the 
issue. First in Nur, race was implicitly raised where the dissenting judges 
pointed to the actual history of the Snobelen case on which the majority’s 
hypothetical was based.111 As noted above, the race and class differences 
between Snobelen and Nur are readily apparent, even if they are 
unacknowledged by the Court. The second and explicit notation of race 
was in Lloyd, where the dissenting opinion referred to intervener 
submissions that developed hypotheticals based on race, indigeneity, 
drug addiction and the unique experience of female offenders. Echoing 
Code J.’s remarks in the trial decision, the dissenting justices cautioned 
against allowing those characteristics to “overwhelm the analysis”.112 In 
this way, the continuing lack of acknowledgement of the race of actual 
offenders in section 12 cases, and the ongoing construction of reasonable 
hypotheticals that lack any racial identity, constitute further examples of 
the erasure of race (and differentiated experiences based on race) from 
the criminal justice system.113 
Critics of this argument may well respond that it seems churlish to 
criticize the Court on this point given that ultimately the mandatory 
minimums in both Nur and Lloyd were ruled unconstitutional. It may be 
that, aware of the tiresome rhetoric about judicial activism and 
interference with Parliamentary intent, the Court found it unnecessary to 
turn to more controversial personal characteristics that veer too close to 
section 15 grounds in order to achieve the same result.  
                                                                                                                       
110 Nur, supra, note 2, at para. 73 et seq.  
111 Id., at para. 127 (dissenting reasons of Moldaver J.). 
112 Lloyd, supra, note 1, at paras. 101-103. 
113 B.L. Berger, “Race and Erasure in R v Mann” (2004) 21 Criminal Reports (6th) 58. 
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While this is a plausible argument, the Court’s decision is neither 
neutral nor consequence-free. First, avoiding the question of race in 
section 12 also avoids addressing the question of disparate impacts under 
section 15 that have been the subject of much recent criticism.114 
Intentional or not, the failure to consider racialized and gendered 
hypotheticals or to fully consider the race of the actual accused in 
assessing the constitutionality of the provision under the first branch of 
the section 12 test has the ancillary benefit of not revitalizing or 
contradicting what appears to be a rather moribund state of affairs in 
adverse effects litigation.  
Erasing the race (among other potentially relevant grounds such as 
gender or even socio-economic class) of the hypothetical offender 
reflects the broader tendencies of the legal system to ignore or justify its 
discriminatory effects by first abstracting away from the particular 
wrinkles of the specific offender it judges, and then re-examining that 
bereft persona in light of the neutral, universal reasonable person that 
McLachlin J. envisaged in Creighton.115 Once diluted into their platonic 
form, individual offenders become bystanders to the subsequent legal 
analysis that purports to consider the reasonableness of their behaviour. 
Accused persons become holograms at their own trials, present but 
flickering as they are necessarily denuded of substance in order to enable 
a pseudo-scientific process of reasonability examinations.  
That process is pseudo-scientific because the justification for erasure 
of individual characteristics in constructing the reasonable person is that 
it allows for a meaningfully objective standard to be derived. Yet 
contrary to McLachlin J.’s formulation, the reasonable person often 
“bears the characteristics of the dominant classes in the community and 
so tacitly entrenches the privileges of that class in criminal law 
doctrine.”116 The question of reasonableness is implicitly subjectivized 
through the infusion of the particular views of the judge(s) at hand,117 a 
                                                                                                                       
114 See, e.g., J. Watson-Hamilton & J. Koshan, “Adverse Impact: The Supreme Court’s 
Approach to Adverse Effects Discrimination Under Section 15 of the Charter” (2014), 19:2 Review 
of Constitutional Studies 191; and R. Cairns Way, “An Opportunity for Equality: Kokopenace and 
Nur at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2014) 61 Crim. L.Q. 465. 
115 Justice McLachlin (as she then was) described this process in R. v. Creighton, [1993] 
S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3, 105 D.L.R. (4th) 632, at para. 63 (S.C.C.). 
116 D. Young, “Claims for Recognition and the Generalized Other: The Reasonable Person 
and Judgment in Criminal Law” (2008) 23 C.J.L.S. 15, at 23-24 [hereinafter “Young”].  
117 M.-È. Sylvestre, “The Redistributive Potential of Section 7 of the Charter: Incorporating 
Socio-Economic Context in Criminal Law and in the Adjudication of Rights” (2010-2011) 42 
Ottawa L. Rev. 389-409, at 394. 
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fear recognized in the Supreme Court.118 The reasonable person remains 
an equally subjective concept, albeit one usually constructed as the 
amalgam of a specific constellation of gendered, racialized, and socio-
economic experiences: the “default characteristics” of the reasonable 
person are those of a privileged white man.119 While this has begun to 
change in some specific contexts of the law,120 the reasonable person 
concept arguably has become justificatory in nature — “a vehicle for 
expressing the ultimate judicial point of view, rather than for questioning 
it.”121 Section 12 jurisprudence, however, remains relatively untroubled 
by such considerations as the actual experience of the actual offenders 
facing the punishment in question and — as seen in the Court’s reliance 
on the case of John Snobelen in Nur — at times explicitly and actively 
adopts the “default characteristics” of the middle class white male.  
Second, the Court’s lack of reference to race, for example, does not 
mean race is absent from its decision. The dissents in both Nur and Lloyd 
point out the racialized dynamics of the decisions by identifying a 
wealthy, White middle-aged male politician turned rancher as the source 
of one of the hypotheticals, and explicitly rejecting African-Canadian, 
Indigenous, and female experiences as overwhelming and irrelevant to 
the analysis. In the minority’s view, the normal, non-overwhelming 
category that should be the starting point for section 12 is a highly 
specific and highly racialized one of a White man. The majority’s failure 
to mention race in either of these cases or even address the implications 
of the minority position on these issues inadvertently whitewashes the 
systemic racism of the criminal justice system from consideration under 
section 12. That the dissent and majority in Lloyd argue over whether 
including drug addiction and treatment in the construction of a 
reasonable hypothetical is “far-fetched” or “remote” but implicitly (in the 
case of the majority) and explicitly (in the case of the dissent) refuse to 
                                                                                                                       
118 In her dissenting judgment in Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 
at 546, 124 D.L.R. (4th) 609 (S.C.C.), L’Heureux-Dubé J. warns of the futility of relying on the 
“reasonable, secular, able-bodied white male”.  
119 M. Moran, “The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative 
Perspective”, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1233 at 1276 (2010) [hereinafter “Moran”]: “The gist of the 
worry is that without modification of his imputed or default characteristics, the reasonable person is 
presumptively male, white, able-bodied, literate and the like.” 
120 See, e.g., Young, supra, note 116, examining R. v. M.L.B., [2004] S.J. No 755 (Sask. 
Prov. Ct.); R. v. Lavallee, [1990] S.C.J. No. 36, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, 55 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) and 
R. v. McConnell, [1996] S.C.J. No. 51, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 48 C.R. (4th) 199 (S.C.C.).  
121 Moran, supra, note 119, at 1278. Moran further notes, at 1281, that in equality and 
discrimination claims, the reasonable person standard is more likely to undermine substantive 
equality goals. 
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admit race into the analysis suggests the Court going to great lengths to 
avoid commenting on the elephant in the room: the well-documented 
over-policing and over-representation of racial minorities in Canada.  
In such a context, there ought to be nothing remote or far-fetched 
about including race in the construction of a reasonable hypothetical, 
particularly given the admonitions in section 12 cases to focus on 
situations that “commonly arise in day-to-day” situations122 and that are 
based on reported cases as a starting point to which “additional 
circumstances can be added”.123 Justice Code was presented with exactly 
this possibility in Nur, when given evidence that the offence Nur was 
charged with was one that in his community of Toronto was 
overwhelmingly charged against African-Canadians. Yet both Code J. 
and the Supreme Court go out of their way to avoid race in the section 12 
argumentation. Similarly, in Lloyd, the minority complains in part that 
plugging “addiction” in as a feature of the accused in the hypothetical is 
unfair, even though Lloyd himself was recognized as a drug addict. 
Indeed, given the nature of controlled substances and drugs, and the 
rationale for their control, there ought to be little surprising about the 
idea that many drug users and traffickers are also drug addicts. While it is 
a limited step, the Court’s inclusion of addiction as a characteristic of the 
individual in Lloyd is an important step even if it is translated into the 
context of a redemption narrative. 
As noted above, it is possible that the Court might see the inclusion of 
race or addiction or indigeneity as unnecessarily “stacking the deck” in 
favour of finding sentencing provisions unconstitutional. Yet if the 
Court’s concern is about presenting neutral hypotheticals to test the 
constitutional boundaries of sentencing provisions, surely there is 
nothing more neutral than the cases that police and Crown choose to 
pursue. Judicial design of an example makes that hypothetical vulnerable 
to attacks that the judge has tainted the example in a way that favours his 
or her ultimate view on the impugned law. Reliance on actual cases that 
are chosen initially by law enforcement agents and prosecutors sheds this 
complaint, and judges concerned with neutrality ought to draw their 
examples from specific cases. In many instances, given the over-policing 
of particular communities, this will lead to the entirely defensible 
inclusion of race and/or indigeneity (and perhaps even gender and class) 
in the hypothetical.  
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When the inclusion of such factors is based on actual cases, the resultant 
hypothetical is much less vulnerable to critique. As it stands, the reluctance 
to include these factors doubly punishes offenders. At the front-end of the 
criminal process, these individuals are disproportionately likely to be 
investigated and charged for some offences. At the back-end however, post-
conviction, they cannot rely on the fact of that disproportionate attention 
when reasonable hypotheticals are being designed. Explaining to the Black 
or Indigenous offender that her race is not to be considered because it 
would be favourable to her would be hard to reconcile with the experience 
of many minorities caught up in the criminal justice system. Of course, 
from the point of view of the offender, the logic becomes sadly coherent if 
it is explained that her blackness or indigeneity are not considered because 
it might lead to less punishment for her.  
Finally, the avoidance of race in the design of reasonable 
hypotheticals has powerful implications for the continued viability of 
mandatory minimum sentences and other potential constitutional 
challenges. There first is a risk that the lack of recognition of race in 
section 12 analyses to date will lead to the same result with respect to the 
exercise of statutory exemptions if and when they are incorporated into 
the Criminal Code. In addition, the effect of avoiding the question of 
race has been to prolong the lifespan of mandatory minimum sentences. 
In their declaration that including race would “overwhelm the analysis”, 
the dissent in Lloyd echoed the comments of Code J. in Nur. There, in the 
context of a section 15 argument, Code J. acknowledged that the fact of 
widespread discriminatory enforcement of the criminal law would render 
virtually every mandatory imprisonment provision unconstitutional. 
Unacknowledged in the section 12 jurisprudence is this background 
concern that the inclusion of race in a reasonable hypothetical would 
have catastrophic effects on the continuation of mandatory minimum 
sentences, far more than that contemplated by Lloyd as it currently 
stands. It is a Kafkaesque condition that prevents the acknowledgement 
of race in a manner that might favour the offender precisely because of 
the otherwise pervasive emphasis on race that discriminates against and 
harms those same individuals elsewhere in the criminal justice process.  
V. CONCLUSION 
What remains most remarkable about Lloyd is not how much it changes, 
but how much it leaves relatively unaltered. At one end, the various 
(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d) MANDATORY MINIMUM LITIGATION 145 
predictions that no mandatory minimums can withstand scrutiny under the 
section 12 application seem premature and even wilfully blind to the 
pragmatism that continues to infuse section 12 and Charter jurisprudence in 
respect of a range of other rights (primarily section 8 and section 10) when 
those rights are implicated in the context of criminal law.  
Yet even if some mandatory minimum sentences continue to fall, 
many will remain and a number have been upheld even after Lloyd. The 
new rules about personal characteristics in reasonable hypotheticals offer 
some greater leeway perhaps, but little guidance. And, while Lloyd 
injected some degree of personalization into the imagined offender 
caught in the reasonable hypothetical in that case, neither Lloyd nor Nur 
nor any other cases have consistently engaged with the idea that 
mandatory minimum sentences might have a grossly disproportionate 
impact on offenders who are members of historically disadvantaged 
groups and for whom, as a result of their membership in such groups, 
mandatory minimum sentences might be grossly disproportionate. 
Moreover, the normative foundation for this ongoing omission lies in 
part in the concept of Parliamentary sovereignty, but is also being 
developed by the Court in adjacent areas of the law — in establishing the 
standard of review for sentences, in adjudicating disparate impacts cases 
under section 15, and in subordinating a substantive equality-infused 
notion of proportionality to a more formalist notion.  
What is most remarkable is that in its desire to avoid constructing the 
most sympathetic counter-example for section 12 purposes — even 
where doing so would reflect the common day-to-day experiences of 
many offenders — the Court effectively treats hypothetical accused with 
greater empathy and compassion, and arguably does a better job of 
recognizing the intersectional realities of their hypothetical experiences, 
than it does the offenders actually before them. 
 
